Findings, updated 22 November 2026

What the simulation found, and what it got wrong

Shared Sky is a scenario model of delivery drones (Wing, Zipline, Amazon) and of air taxis between Texas airports and vertiports, built from FAA filings, company announcements and Census data. It is not a forecast and nobody has endorsed it. No person outside the project has reviewed it yet; the reviews so far were done by AI reviewers. Predictions are written down and fingerprinted before the runs; this page shows the ones that came true and the ones that did not.

Read this first. Every result here comes from a simulation, not from real flights, and none has been checked against real operations: the companies do not publish flight-level data, and the air-taxi networks are scenarios built from announced sites. Read each percentage as “what happens in this model under these assumptions”, not as what operators will see. Being reproducible and pre-registered makes the work checkable, not accurate. The assumptions that move the numbers most are listed at the end.

Being re-checked (22 November 2026). A review of the engine found three counting problems. Drones that change their plan in flight (stops, return-home, outages) are undercounted; the random errors given to neighbouring flights were correlated; and some studies counted meetings after the measured window ended. The headline result (72 % / 73 %) is not affected. Results from ERRORS1, ERRORS2, PRELAUNCH, RECOUNT1 and the bad-day and return-home studies are provisional until they are re-run with the fixed engine, with the re-runs pre-registered and any changed verdicts reported here.

Guess first

Before you read the results, try four of the questions this project asked. Each answer also shows what I predicted, in writing, before the simulation ran. Your guesses stay in your browser; nothing is sent anywhere.

1. If the three delivery-drone companies each flew their own slice of the height band they already filed, how much would planned conflicts between them fall?

2. If drones check their flight plans against each other before take-off and wait when they overlap, what share of flights would have to wait in windy hours?

3. Flying between twelve announced Texas air-taxi sites, what share of Dallas–Fort Worth jobs would have a commute at least 10 minutes faster at peak?

4. With air taxis flying until midnight at the busiest level, how many people live where the noise reaches a day–night average of 55 dB (a busy street)?

The headline: sharing out heights cuts planned conflicts by about 72 % (Houston) and 73 % (DFW)

If each delivery company flies its own slice of height inside the band it already filed with the FAA, planned conflicts between the companies fall by 72 % in Houston (95 % range 67–76 %) and 73 % in Dallas–Fort Worth (66–80 %), with Amazon at its best-sourced heights. A planned conflict is two companies’ planned paths within 30 m sideways and under 10 m vertically, with no coordination between them. Real layouts at the filed site counts, 10 runs each.

It depends on: where Amazon really flies home (if near 400 ft, as one secondhand staff remark says, the cut is 29 % / 35 %), and on 10 m between companies being enough (at 15 m it is 55 % / 45 %). The ranges cover random site layouts, not model error. With a realistic plan-sharing check 99–99.6 % of them are removed either way (10 windy hours, SEEDS2), and height sharing roughly halves how many flights have to wait (COORD1). In collision risk at average GPS, though, that check leaves the shared-out heights slightly more residual risk than the best-sourced heights, because Amazon’s and Zipline’s layers sit exactly 20 m apart, at the edge of what the check sees (RISK2); the gaps need a margin. Wing’s and Zipline’s sites are placed at random because their lists are not public. Two later checks: with all three companies on departure corridors the cut is 71 % / 82 % (CORR2); with the filed overlap caps applied the cut is 72 % / 59 % but absolute conflicts fall by 82–90 %, so every absolute count here is an upper bound (CAPS1). The model flies in wind but not in rain: in 2025 about 22 % (Houston) and 13 % (DFW) of daytime hours had measurable rain and 4–5 % had heavy rain or 55 km/h gusts; the data cannot see thunderstorms (WX1).

Source: planned/HEADLINE2_RESULTS_2026-10-25.md, COORD1_RESULTS_2026-10-26.md, CORR2_RESULTS_2026-10-28.md, CAPS1_RESULTS_2026-10-28.md, WX1_RESULTS_2026-10-29.md

The scorecard

316 of 413

97 registered predictions failed and 4 were not scored (a pre-run check failed, or the case never occurred). They are across 77 studies, drones and air taxis; each is listed in the study record. Some passes were easy predictions; the failures are the informative part. A model whose predictions always come true has not been tested.

passedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedpassedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailedfailed
passedfailed (crossed)

1. Thinner reserved blocks plus a different layer order cut drone delays by about three quarters

Drones that fly in the same airspace reserve a block of sky around their planned path and wait if it overlaps another. With the shared-out heights this project proposes and 10 m blocks, about 1 flight in 5 to 6 waits in windy hours. I had predicted at most 5 % delayed (COORD1); it was 17–19 % (confirmed over 10 windy hours each, SEEDS2). Putting Zipline on the top layer does nothing alone, and thinner blocks do most of the work; together they cut the delayed share to about 4 %.

0%5%10%15%20%Houston, Shared-out heights, 10 m blocks: 18.5%18.5%Houston, Thinner 5 m blocks: 7.9%7.9%Houston, Zipline on top + 5 m blocks: 4.4%4.4%HoustonDallas–Fort Worth, Shared-out heights, 10 m blocks: 17%17%Dallas–Fort Worth, Thinner 5 m blocks: 6.8%6.8%Dallas–Fort Worth, Zipline on top + 5 m blocks: 4.1%4.1%Dallas–Fort Worth
Shared-out heights, 10 m blocksThinner 5 m blocksZipline on top + 5 m blocks
Share of flights delayed by the plan check, simulated delivery drones at the filed site counts, windy hours (about the 90th percentile of 2025 wind), 6 seeds of 2 measured hours.
Table view
MetroShared-out, 10 m blocksThinner blocksZipline on top + thinner blocks
Houston18.5 %7.9 %4.4 %
Dallas–Fort Worth17.0 %6.8 %4.1 %

Source: planned/LAYER2_RESULTS_2026-10-27.md

Not shown: that 5 m blocks are safe. The simulated conflict counts are 0 to 3 per arm, too few to show a difference. GPS-level errors are tested in the next section.

1b. The height-sharing cut shrinks with GPS error, mostly because of height error

Provisional: ERRORS1 and ERRORS2 used correlated random errors between neighbouring flights and are being re-run (see the note at the top).

The headline runs fly every drone exactly on its plan. ERRORS1 (276 runs, both metros) gives each flight a random sideways error, height error and late start, sized to published figures: near the best monitored GPS sites (L1), the GPS standard’s committed average (L2), its committed worst site (L3), and the size the FAA Remote ID rule allows (L4). This study compares the shared-out heights with the heights the companies filed (not with Amazon’s best-sourced heights, which give the 72 % / 73 % headline and were not rerun here). Without errors that cut is 80 % in Houston and 81 % in DFW on these six seeds; with them it is 76 % / 79 % at L1, 63 % / 59 % at L2, 30 % / 26 % at L3 and 20 % / 23 % at L4. Height error alone does nearly all of this; sideways error or late starts alone change the cut by 3 points or less. I predicted the cut would fall further at L2–L4 (3 of 13 predictions failed).

The plan-sharing check is affected too: the minimal reservation (30 m wide, ±10 m high) removes 83 % / 77 % of flown conflicts at L2 but only 18 % / 22 % at L4, while a block taller than the height error (±46 m) removes almost all, at the cost of roughly twice as many flights waiting (37 % / 47 % in windy hours against 18 % / 17 %).

Read with care: errors here are independent between flights, but real GPS and barometer errors are partly shared by nearby drones, so L2–L4 probably overstate the damage. The late-start size is my assumption, and I found no published figure for the height accuracy of delivery drones, so none of these levels is a measurement of any company’s aircraft. Six seeds; intervals are wide (for example DFW at L4: 12–32 %).

The headline case and shared errors (ERRORS2). Against Amazon’s best-sourced heights (the 72 % / 73 % headline), the cut behaves the same way: 71 % / 73 % at best-site GPS, 60 % / 54 % at the average, 22 % / 23 % at the Remote ID size. But nearby drones share most of their error, because they see the same satellites and the same air pressure. Splitting each error into a shared and a personal part shows that only the personal part matters for separation: if 80–95 % is shared, the average-GPS cut is 66–75 %, close to the no-error 72–74 %. How much is shared on real delivery drones is not measured, so the independent-error numbers above are the pessimistic end. All 10 predictions held, some with wide bands.

1c. In collision risk, not just conflicts, height sharing gives about the same cut

A planned conflict at 25 m is not the same as one at 1 m. RISK1 turns every planned encounter between companies (36,150 over 40 runs) into a collision probability with the Reich model used by ICAO: the drones collide if their errors bring them closer than their combined size. Against Amazon at its best-sourced heights, sharing out heights cuts modelled collision risk by 79 % (Houston) and 82 % (DFW) at best-site GPS and 61 % / 58 % at the GPS standard’s average; if most of the error is shared by nearby drones, the average-GPS cut is 78–83 %. At the Remote ID size it is at least 16–18 %. All 5 predictions held.

Read with care: these runs have no plan-sharing check and no avoidance, so the rates (about 1 modelled collision per 10,000 flight hours) describe plans as filed, not real operations, where the plan check removes 98–99 % of conflicts at average-or-better GPS. Zipline’s and Amazon’s sizes are not published and are assumed; risk roughly doubles with double the size. Without errors the counts are whole events (3 planned collisions in about 31,500 Houston flight hours with best-sourced heights, 0 with shared-out heights; 2 and 1 in DFW). This is a model quantity, not a safety assessment.

1d. Drones dodging each other over Remote ID barely helps once GPS has its normal error

AVOID1 gives every drone a simple avoidance rule, with figures from an FAA-funded Remote ID avoidance test (BAA004: detection at 100–500 m, message gaps of 5 s or more, 36 of 51 test encounters avoided): detect the other drone at 300 m, react after 6 s, climb or descend at 2 m/s towards a 10 m gap. With exact GPS this removes 71 % of the modelled collision risk. At the GPS standard’s average error it removes only 3–5 %, even if every alert is acted on (4–7 %). Most of that risk comes from drones planned more than 10 m apart in height that their errors bring together, and each drone broadcasts where it thinks it is, so the broadcasts cannot show it; and a 10 m gap is inside the height error. Height sharing still cuts the remaining risk by 57–61 % and the number of manoeuvres by three quarters. I predicted a 50–71 % cut; 2 of 5 predictions failed.

Read with care: one manoeuvre per encounter, the other drone does not react, climb rate and latency are assumptions, and no plan check (as RISK1). Avoidance with sensors that see true positions (radar, cameras) is not modelled and could do better.

1e. With plans checked before take-off, the modelled risk mostly disappears, and the shared-out heights show a weak spot

RISK2 switches on the plan-sharing check before computing collision risk. The minimal check (blocks 30 m half-width, ±10 m high) removes 81–96 % of the modelled risk at the GPS standard’s average error and effectively all of it at best-site GPS; a larger check (±46 m) removes all of it but delays 40–48 % of flights and cancels about a quarter. With the minimal check, though, the shared-out heights keep more residual risk than Amazon’s best-sourced heights (Houston 0.93 vs 0.82, DFW 1.11 vs 0.51 modelled collisions per 100,000 flight hours). The reason is the layout: Amazon’s outbound height (81 m) and Zipline’s (101 m) are exactly 20 m apart, the edge of what ±10 m blocks can see, so the check never flags the pair while average GPS errors can still bring them together; they cause about 90 % of what is left. Height sharing still halves the flights the check delays (19 % vs 40 % in Houston, 17 % vs 37 % in DFW). Layer gaps and check sizes have to be set together, with a margin for height error. 3 of 5 predictions failed.

Read with care: still air, block sizes are my assumptions (the ASTM standard is paywalled), and the residual rates rest on few encounters. A model quantity, not a safety assessment.

1f. Bad GPS among tall buildings hardly moves the metro-wide figure

ERRORS3 gives downtown the urban-canyon error measured by NASA Langley in Columbus, Ohio (95th percentile 47.8 m sideways raw, 4.4 m with their processing) and keeps average GPS elsewhere. Metro-wide modelled collision risk changes by +0.1 %, because downtown is about 0.2 % of each counted area and holds under 0.4 % of the close encounters. If every place had canyon-sized sideways error, risk without a plan check changes by at most 6 %. I predicted that with the minimal plan check the residual risk would rise by at least 50 % under canyon error everywhere; it changed by −11 % to +17 %, so that prediction failed. A likely reason, not tested here, is that the check's weak spot is height gaps (RISK2), which sideways error does not touch. Errors that wander during a flight were settled by argument (same size at any moment, same expected rate), not by runs. 1 of 4 predictions failed.

Read with care: downtown is a box, not a building-by-building signal model; one city, one study; height error assumed unaffected; still air; lower bound with canyon error everywhere (90 m search). A model quantity, not a safety assessment.

1g. Weather stops and dinner-time peaks add conflicts, because conflicts grow with the square of traffic

Doubling traffic roughly quadruples planned conflicts (exponent 1.98–2.09, WX2). So anything that bunches flights adds conflicts even when the day's total is the same. If drones stop in 2025's bad-weather hours (3.9 % of daytime hours in Houston, 4.6 % in DFW) and catch up afterwards at up to 1.5 times the normal rate, a year has about 6–7 % more planned conflicts. If orders peak at lunch and dinner with the busiest hour twice the average, a day has 40–48 % more, and the busiest hour about 4 times an even hour (DEMAND1). Height sharing keeps its 72–75 % cut in both. Every absolute count on this site assumes even demand, so it is low by about that much. At double traffic the plan check's delayed share barely moved while cancellations rose (I predicted the opposite). 2 of 8 predictions failed.

Read with care: stop rule, catch-up rate and peak size are assumptions; the demand shape is from food delivery in Beijing; thunderstorms are not in the weather data; still air.

1h. Real helicopters fly lower than I expected, but meet few drones

HELI1 uses 14 days of 2025 public flight-tracking data (adsb.lol, ODbL): 1,199 helicopter-days over Houston and Dallas–Fort Worth. 30 % of helicopter time over the counted areas in Houston and 46 % in DFW is below 150 m above ground, and 14–17 % is inside the drone height band (46–121 m). I had predicted under 15 % and under 8 %, so three of five predictions failed. The shares move a lot with the ground height I assumed (roughly 20–60 % below 150 m), and volunteer receivers miss low flights, so they are floors. Against the drone traffic of the simulation, a low-flying helicopter has on average 0.03 drones (Houston) or 0.009 (DFW) in a 450 × 450 × 60 m box around it, and height sharing makes no difference to that. This counts exposure, not encounters or collisions.

Read with care: ground elevation is an assumption, heights are pressure altitude, helicopters and drones are not matched in time of day, and rules or avoidance that would separate them are not modelled. No aircraft identifiers are published.

2. About 1% of jobs or fewer would see a commute that flying shortens, and the number is very uncertain

Using Census blocks and the Census commute-flow data, I counted existing commuters whose door-to-door time falls by 10 minutes or more if they flew between two of the twelve Texas sites Archer announced on 23 October 2026 (a different, larger network than the seven sites on the air-taxi page). The single run I first published gave 3.1 % of jobs in Dallas–Fort Worth and 1.3 % in Houston. Letting the uncertain inputs vary shows that was an optimistic reading.

0%1%2%3%4%5%Dallas–Fort Worth5th to 95th percentile 0.02% to 4.93%25th to 75th percentile 0.32% to 2.8%median 1.2%single-point run 3.05%median 1.2%single point 3.05%Houston5th to 95th percentile 0.22% to 2.43%25th to 75th percentile 0.34% to 0.94%median 0.48%single-point run 1.28%median 0.48%single point 1.28%
Share of jobs with a commute that flying between two of Archer’s twelve announced sites would shorten by 10 minutes or more at peak. Line: 5th to 95th percentile; bar: 25th to 75th; tick: median; diamond: the single-point run.
Table view
Metro5th25thmedian75th95thsingle point
Dallas–Fort Worth0.02 %0.32 %1.20 %2.80 %4.93 %3.05 %
Houston0.22 %0.34 %0.48 %0.94 %2.43 %1.28 %

Source: planned/UNCERT1_RESULTS_2026-10-27.md, planned/ACCESS1B_ADDENDUM_2026-10-27.md

Not shown: riders. This counts people with a time saving at zero fare, ignoring queues, weather, aircraft limits and whether anyone would pay. The input ranges are my assumptions. The biggest driver is how fast the road is that people would otherwise drive. Beneficiaries commute about 67–77 km in a straight line against a typical 20 km, and they do not hold a higher share of high-wage jobs than average: that prediction failed.

3. How a vertiport lets aircraft land matters more than how many stands it has

When parking stands are limited, an arriving aircraft may have to wait in the air. With two landing pads per site, the simple first-come rule never met the service and battery-reserve test at 3 requests an hour, however many stands there were. Booking the landing slot when the aircraft takes off needed 8 stands per site; holding the aircraft on the ground until a stand is reserved needed 5, at the price of longer waits for passengers (about 225–285 seconds against 46–130).

0481216DFW, 2 pads, First come, first served: neverneverDFW, 2 pads, Landing slot booked at take-off: 88DFW, 2 pads, Hold on the ground until a stand is reserved: 55DFW, 2 padsHouston, 2 pads, First come, first served: neverneverHouston, 2 pads, Landing slot booked at take-off: 88Houston, 2 pads, Hold on the ground until a stand is reserved: 55Houston, 2 padsDFW, 4 pads, First come, first served: 77DFW, 4 pads, Landing slot booked at take-off: 77DFW, 4 pads, Hold on the ground until a stand is reserved: 55DFW, 4 padsHouston, 4 pads, First come, first served: 66Houston, 4 pads, Landing slot booked at take-off: 66Houston, 4 pads, Hold on the ground until a stand is reserved: 55Houston, 4 pads
First come, first servedLanding slot booked at take-offHold on the ground until a stand is reserved
Parking stands per site needed to meet the service and reserve test at 3 requests an hour per route direction. “Never” means no stand count up to 16 met it.
Table view
CaseFirst comeSlot at take-offHold on ground
DFW, 2 padsnever (>16)85
Houston, 2 padsnever (>16)85
DFW, 4 pads775
Houston, 4 pads665

Source: planned/PADRULE1_RESULTS_2026-10-27.md

Not shown: a certified procedure. Real arrival priority, go-arounds and weather are not modelled, and stand counts at real airports are not public. One of the six predictions for this study failed.

4. The aircraft fleet needed is fairly robust; the charging rate is what moves it

Across the stated ranges for pad time, turnaround, charging rate and flown distance, the required fleet moves by one or two steps. A faster charger shrinks it most. It rises quickly with demand: each doubling of requests multiplies the aircraft by about 1.6 to 2.

010203040501.53612requests per hour, per route directionDFW, 1.5 per hour: 8 aircraftDFW, 3 per hour: 14 aircraftDFW, 6 per hour: 24 aircraftDFW, 12 per hour: 48 aircraftDFWHouston, 1.5 per hour: 5 aircraftHouston, 3 per hour: 8 aircraftHouston, 6 per hour: 14 aircraftHouston, 12 per hour: 28 aircraftHouston
Aircraft needed to serve 95 % of requests with a median wait under 10 minutes, with 100 km usable after a 20-minute reserve (the Part 135 daytime VFR minimum that powered-lift able to land vertically along the route may use, 14 CFR 194.306(ss) as quoted in FAA AC 194-1; otherwise 30 minutes by day, which changes nothing here, or 45 at night, not modelled) and unlimited parking stands. Requests are per route direction: DFW has 8 route directions and Houston 4, so 1.5 requests an hour means 12 and 6 trips an hour on the air-taxi page. Lines: assumed central inputs. Whiskers at 3 and 6 requests an hour: 5th to 95th percentile when the inputs vary over the stated ranges. The two sources used different setups: the lines come from NET3 (8 pads per site, unlimited stands), the whiskers from UNCERT1 (4 pads, the landing-slot rule, unlimited stands), so a line can sit at the low edge of its whisker (Houston at 3 requests an hour: line 8, median of the draws 10). The registered inputs behind the lines favour a small fleet.
Table view
Requests/h per route directionDFWHouston
1.585
314 (12–16)8 (8–12)
624 (24–28)14 (12–20)
124828

Source: planned/AIRTAXI_NET3_RESULTS_2026-10-27.md, planned/UNCERT1_RESULTS_2026-10-27.md

Not shown: real demand. The request rates are scenario settings, not forecasts; the charging rate comes from a manufacturer’s marketing figure and aircraft range is a cautious assumption checked against Wisk’s and Joby’s stated figures (planned/AIRTAXI_INPUTS_ADDENDUM_2026-10-28.md).

5. How well my own predictions held up

Every study here was registered with predictions before it ran, each written as “this will hold”. Of the 353 that were scored before this check, 274 held (78 %, 95 % interval 73–82 %). I was overconfident by about 22 points, and I found no kind of prediction I was better at.

50%60%70%80%90%100%every prediction said “holds”: 100%All scored predictions95% interval 73 to 82%All scored predictions: 274 of 353 held (77.6%)Ranges and limits95% interval 73 to 82%Ranges and limits: 251 of 323 held (77.7%)Comparisons and claims95% interval 59 to 88%Comparisons and claims: 23 of 30 held (76.7%)Delivery-drone studies95% interval 68 to 80%Delivery-drone studies: 162 of 217 held (74.7%)Air-taxi studies95% interval 73 to 87%Air-taxi studies: 101 of 125 held (80.8%)First half of the project95% interval 71 to 83%First half of the project: 138 of 177 held (78.0%)Second half95% interval 71 to 83%Second half: 136 of 176 held (77.3%)
Share of registered predictions that held, by group, with 95 % intervals. Dashed line: what every prediction implied.
Table view
GroupHeld / scoredRate
All scored predictions274 / 35377.6 %
Ranges and limits251 / 32377.7 %
Comparisons and claims23 / 3076.7 %
Delivery-drone studies162 / 21774.7 %
Air-taxi studies101 / 12580.8 %
First half of the project138 / 17778.0 %
Second half136 / 17677.3 %

Source: planned/CALIB1_RESULTS_2026-10-31.md, planned/calib1_results_table.md

Not shown: that these are independent tests. Predictions inside one study share data and a model, so the intervals are too narrow. I also chose the questions. I predicted five things about my own forecasting and only one held (the lean toward worse results); the other four were wrong (registered in planned/CALIB1_PREREG.md). Coding by three independent coders; a blind re-check of 10 % of rows agreed on every verdict.

Other results, in one line each

How the work is done

Method in brief (for regulators and planners)

What this is not, and what moves the numbers

The assumptions that change the results most, from the studies above: